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Banks and Environmental Sustainability: 
Some reflections from the perspective 
of financial stability  
María J. Nieto 
Key points for policy-makers 
There is growing evidence suggesting that climate change risks have important implications for 
financial stability, although the analysis of the complexity of the potential risks to the financial 
sector is still at an early stage. This Policy Brief quantifies the direct (syndicated) loan exposure 
to elevated environmental risk sectors of the largest banks in the EU, Switzerland, the US, Japan 
and China on average at between 0.3 to 3.7% of total banking assets and €1.35 trillion in total 
as of December 2014.  
Policy recommendations 
The policy recommendations operationalise the 2016 recommendations on climate-related 
issues issued by the Enhanced Disclosure Task Force (EDTF) to G20 countries and advise revising 
the banks´ prudential policy to consider environmental risks. 
 Better understanding the direct exposure to high environmental risk sectors demands a 
reliable and harmonised statistical framework that allows for detailed identification of 
sectors exposed to high environmental risks along the SIC (and NACE in the EEA) 
classifications. 
 Develop credit registers to become a tool that facilitates the assessment of environmental 
risk drivers in ‘carbon stress tests’. 
 Environmental aspects should be considered in the revisions of the assessment 
methodology of the Basel Core Principles for Effective Bank Supervision.   
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Introduction 
Financial policy and regulation are increasingly recognised as important dimensions of the 
transition towards a low carbon economy, which is consistent with the full implementation of 
the Paris Agreement.1 There is a growing recognition that the inculcation of green guidelines 
and standards into bank lending, trading and investment practices are critical for achieving the 
core mandates of international financial organisations, such as the International Monetary 
Fund and the World Bank. Economic growth and financial development should aim to be 
economically, socially and environmentally sustainable. Furthermore, it is widely accepted that 
low-income developing countries (LIDCs) are especially vulnerable to the projected effects of 
climate change and will need significant assistance in the form of concessional climate finance 
to support adaptation efforts. The impact of the transition on financial stability depends 
primarily on the speed and the smoothness of the transition to a green economy and 
adjustment costs.2 
Against this backdrop, this Policy Brief explores potential prudential policy responses that could 
contribute to internalising the negative externalities associated with climate change by both 
banks and their prudential supervisors.  
1. Scenarios for the transition to low-carbon economy 
Controlling climate-change risks requires a decisive shift away from fossil-fuel energy and 
related physical capital. At the same time, the long-term horizon of the commitment to reduce 
emissions (2030) and the cost of short-term action reduce the credibility of some existing 
commitments.3  
There are two broad scenarios for the transition to a low-carbon economy: 
                                                     
1 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (see 
http://unfccc.int/paris_agreement/items/9485.php). Specifically, its objectives were to: i) hold the increase in the 
global average temperature to well below 2°C above pre-industrial levels and pursue efforts to limit the 
temperature increase to 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels, recognizing that this would significantly reduce the risks 
and impacts of climate change; ii) increase the ability to adapt to the adverse impacts of climate change and foster 
climate resilience and low greenhouse gas emissions development; and iii) to promote more consistent financial 
flows towards low greenhouse gas emissions and climate-resilient development” (see 
http://unfccc.int/files/essential_background/convention/application/pdf/english_paris_agreement.pdf). 
2 See speech given by Mark Carney, Governor of the Bank of England, “Breaking the Tragedy of the Horizon – 
Climate Change and Financial Stability”, at Lloyd’s of London, 29 September 2015 
(http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Documents/speeches/2015/speech844.pdf). 
3 As of August 2015, 26 countries and territories accounting for more than 55% of global GHG emissions have 
submitted Intended National Determined Contributions (INDCs) with a 2030 target year (2025 in the case of the 
US) (Morgan Stanley, 2015). However, power plants that use combustible organic material, such as oil, coal, or 
natural gas, can operate for up to 40 years, and investment in alternative energy has been dampened by 
unexpected changes in its regulation (e.g. retroactive government plans to curb revenues of already operational 
projects in Bulgaria and Romania and retroactive tariff changes in Germany). 
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First, a gradual and smooth transition to a low-carbon economy that allows adequate time for 
technological progress to contribute to keeping energy costs at socially acceptable levels and 
for the physical stocks of carbon-intensive energy sources to be replenished. This would allow 
the economy to smoothly endogenise changes associated with the transition.  
A smooth transition would require significant and realistic investments in infrastructure (e.g. 
renewable energy), new technologies (e.g. energy storage) and energy efficiency, which will 
have an overall positive effect on the economy. Bank credit quality and the performance of 
investment portfolios would be resilient during the transition (Stern, 2008; Acemoglu et al. 
2012). Governments could enhance the likelihood of this scenario through, for example, the 
gradual increase in emissions taxes, quotas and technological standards. 
Second, an abrupt transition to a low-carbon economy. Although carbon markets encourage 
reductions of emissions, the market signals for future investment are unclear. Newell et al. 
(2014) argue that the evolving nature of carbon markets and associated design changes imply 
that governments cannot provide market certainty, thereby increasing the likelihood this 
scenario. The consequences of an abrupt transition would be a sharp rise in energy costs; a 
severing of the energy supply; sudden depreciation of fossil reserves and economic 
obsolescence of investments and other capital stocks; as well as a downward revaluation of the 
market value of firms according to their exposure to carbon-intensive resources and 
technology. This adverse scenario could have a severe impact on banks’ exposure via the 
following transmission channels:  
(i) GDP growth could be impaired by the increase in the costs related to the supply chain 
and/or changes in the demand for products as well as cost of capital;  
(ii) Direct exposure to high environmental risk sectors: financial assets whose underlying 
value depends on the extraction or usage of combustible organic material as oil, coal or 
natural gas; and 
(iii) Second-round effects due to the financial system’s indirect exposures to carbon-
intensive assets and the global nature of climate change risks. 
Companies in high environmental risk sectors are very much debt-financed either by the bond 
markets or bank loans. Moreover, they have increased their indebtedness since the financial 
crisis, especially in the US and in emerging economy markets. For example, companies in the 
oil and gas sectors almost tripled their levels of debt from 2006 to 2014.4 High leverage will 
increase the severity of the credit losses and debt repricing in the face of a large fall of these 
asset prices.  
2. Impact of transition on banks 
This article focuses on banks’ direct exposure to high environmental-risk sectors in the main 
global banking markets: European Union (EU), Switzerland (CH), the United States (US), Japan 
(JP) and China (CN). In light of the lack of a clear internationally agreed definition of ‘green’ vs. 
                                                     
4 See data in CISnet.com (http://csimarket.com/Industry/industry_Financial_Strength_Ratios.php?ind=107 ). 
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‘brown’ industries, this article considers the exposures to sectors with immediate or emerging 
elevated exposures as defined by Moody’s (2015).  
Table 1. Loans to high environmental risk sectors – Main banking markets (€bn, Dec 2014)  
Sector EU CH US JP CN Total 
Mining: coal 10.4 0.6 6.2 3.4 2.9 23.5 
Unregulated utilities and unregulated 
Power companies 
20.7 1.9 17.3 7.6 1.0 48.5 
Power generation 166.3 12.2 99.6 65.9 19.4 363.4 
Oil and gas: refining and marketing 177.3 17.0 164.0 69.1 11.9 439.3 
Building materials 20.0 1.1 8.9 22.0 0.7 52.8 
Chemicals-commodity 51.2 5.8 36.4 35.9 6.0 135.4 
Steel 18.8 1.9 15.9 12.7 1.7 51.1 
Mining-metals and other materials 
excluding coal 
22.5 2.7 16.2 10.2 5.6 57.3 
Automobile manufacturers 90.9 5.4 52.0 21.7 7.8 177.8 
Total 578.2 48.5 416.6 248.7 57.0 1349.0 
% of total assets 1.4% 2.1% 3.8% 2.1% 0.5% .. 
Notes: Exposure is expressed in value terms (€bn), and it is the outcome of extrapolating to the whole national banking sector, the same 
percentage of the up to 10 largest consolidated banks’ (e.g. foreign subsidiaries excluded) exposure to high environmental risk corporate 
exposures to their total assets. The original values in USD have been converted to EUR based on the 31 December 2014 exchange rate (1 EUR 
= 1.2141 USD). The bank data are obtained from SNL and ECB (only for European banks) as of year-end 2014. For each loan, the share of one 
or more of the analysed banks in the provision of the loans issued to high environmental risk sectors was estimated depending on their role as 
book runner or common participant following the same methodology as Weyzig (2014). 
Source: Thomson ONE Banker 
Sectors exposed to high environmental risks obtain financing from banks. Table 1 shows the 
total estimated value of outstanding loans to high environmental risk sectors as of December 
2014. In order to assess the exposure of the main banking markets to loans issued to corporates 
in the above-mentioned high environmental risk sectors, the Thomson ONE financial database 
for syndicated loans has been used.5 Similarly to Weyzig (2014), the Thomson ONE financial 
database on the banks’ role as book runners is used for syndicated loans; that is, as the lead 
arranger who also provides a large share of the actual lending (bilateral loans are considered 
of marginal relevance). The largest banks from the above-mentioned countries with financial 
information available in SNL Financial and EU banks with financial information available in the 
ECB database are used.6 The comparisons are limited by differences in accounting standards 
(e.g. IFRS vs. US GAAP). 
The total estimated value of the outstanding loan exposures to high environmental risk sectors 
in the EU, Switzerland, the US, Japan and China account for about €1.35 trillion.7 The 
outstanding loan exposures to high environmental risk sectors vary approximately between 
0.5% of total assets of Chinese banks, 1.4% for EU banks and 3.8% for US banks. Looking at the 
individual institutions, the highest exposure of an institution is 8.7% of total assets for a bank 
in the EU (Podravska Banka). In Switzerland the highest exposure of an individual institution is 
                                                     
5 Syndicated loans are considered the bulk of the bank financing.  
6 Subsidiaries and branches of banks from foreign countries have been excluded. 
7 By assessing the relative share of the 10 largest (or total reporting if less) banks’ high environmental risk loan 
exposure to each high environmental risk sector in relation to their total assets, these findings can be extrapolated 
across sectors in the respective country/area (EU, Switzerland, US, Japan and China) to give an indication of the 
country/area total loan exposure to high environmental risk sectors. 
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3.4% (Credit Suisse Group AG), US 6.1% (PNC Financial Services Group), Japan 3.7% (Mizuho 
Financial Group) and China 0.8% (Bank of China Limited).  
Overall, approximately 32.5% of the total value of the facilities was provided to companies 
involved in the exploitation of oil and gas, and 27% of that same value was lent to power 
generation companies. Automobile manufacturers were recipients of 13.2% of the total 
estimated value of outstanding loans to high environmental risk sectors. The remainder was 
financing chemicals, building materials, steel, unregulated utilities and mining (coal and 
metals). 
Table 2. Loans to high environmental risk sectors in selected EU countries – EU (€bn, Dec 2014) 
Sector AT BE DE DK ES FR GR UK IE IT NL PT SE EU 
Mining: coal 0.6 0.1 2.5 - 0.7 2.0 0.3 2.2 - 0.5 1.0 - 0.1 10.4 
Unregulated utilities and Unregulated 
Power companies 
0.0 0.1 2.8 0.0 1.6 5.1 - 4.7 0.1 4.8 1.1 0.2 0.2 20.7 
Power generation 1.3 3.3 40.3 0.3 14.1 29.5 0.1 49.1 2.4 13.1 7.3 1.8 2.5 166.3 
Oil and gas: refining and marketing 2.5 0.7 31.7 0.8 14.1 41.3 0.1 54.5 0.6 8.6 13.7 0.3 7.2 177.3 
Building Materials 0.8 0.3 4.2 0.4 3.3 4.0 0.1 3.6 0.2 1.7 0.9 0.1 0.4 20.0 
Chemicals-commodity 0.8 0.4 16.8 0.0 2.8 8.4 0.0 13.9 0.6 3.5 2.4 0.7 0.8 51.2 
Steel 0.5 0.1 5.8 0.2 1.0 3.6 - 3.8 0.1 1.9 1.3 0.1 0.6 18.8 
Mining-metals and other materials 
excluding coal 
0.1 0.2 2.2 0.0 1.5 7.0 - 8.5 - 1.1 1.2 - 0.1 22.5 
Automobile manufacturers 3.7 0.2 39.2 0.7 4.4 10.4 0.0 18.1 0.3 9.8 2.6 0.0 1.4 90.9 
Total 10.3 5.3 145.5 2.4 43.6 111.2 0.6 158.4 4.3 45.1 31.5 3.2 13.1 578.2 
Source: Thomson ONE Banker. Countries not reporting data either to SNL or Thomson ONE Banker: Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia, 
Luxembourg, Slovakia and Cyprus. Countries with no exposure to high environmental risk sectors: Finland, Lithuania, Malta, Romania and 
Slovenia. Other countries not included in the table that report exposures: Bulgaria (€161 mil.); Croatia (€449 mil. power generation) and 
Hungary (€90 mil. power generation; €259 mil. gas and refining). 
The EU shows the largest value of outstanding loans to high environmental risks sectors 
followed by the US, with approximately 72% of the EU exposure, followed by Japan, China and 
Switzerland. In the EU, Switzerland, the US and Japan, the largest proportion of high 
environmental risk corporate loans is concentrated in oil and gas companies, followed by power 
generation companies. In China, the largest proportion of high environmental risk corporate 
loans is concentrated in power generation companies, followed by oil and gas companies. 
Focusing on the EU countries (see Table 2), the UK shows the largest exposures, in particular to 
the oil and gas sectors, followed by Germany with the largest exposures to power generation, 
followed closely by the automobile sector. In France, the largest exposure to high 
environmental risk sectors is to oil and gas, followed by power generation sectors.  
The environmental risk assessment of the exposures should go hand in hand with the 
understanding of the credit risk involved (e.g. credit risk of revolving facilities vs. project 
finance). The largest value by type of loan corresponds to revolving credit facilities (see Table 
3), overdraft facilities and floating rate notes (approximately 60% of the total loan exposure), 
which provide companies with the option to take up financing from a bank (often a banking 
syndicate).8 The value of revolving credit facilities in Table 3 represents total committed 
amounts not necessarily fully called upon. The typical maturity of revolving facilities is five years 
and they are often renewed; but many companies renegotiate (interest rates, fees) their 
revolving credit facility every year. Term loans are next important in terms of value 
                                                     
8 The maturity mismatch is a particular constraint of financing environmentally friendly projects. 
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(approximately 35%), followed by bridge loans and working capital and acquisition facilities 
(approximately 3%), which are usually used for general corporate purposes. Trade finance, 
which is short term and low credit risk, accounts for approximately 1.2% of the analysed 
syndicated loans, while high credit risk project finance9 and senior unsecured long-term debt 
account for less than 1% of a smaller part of total syndicated loans. In the EU, close to 80% of 
loans to high-risk carbon assets have remaining maturity within the next five years, which is 
comparable to Moody’s time horizon to assess the impact of environmental risks on credit 
quality of market-issued rated debt. 
Table 3. Loans by type of lending instruments – Main banking markets (€bn, Dec 2014) 
Sector Term Loan, Multi 
Loan Facility 
Revolving and 
Overdraft Facility, 
Float rate nts 
Project finance Bridge loan, capital 
and working capital 
facilities, 
acquisition 
Trade finance Long-term debt 
(mezzanine, sub, 
boll) performance 
bonds 
Total 
Mining: coal 13.3 8.8 - 0.2 1.3 - 23.5 
Unregulated utilities and unregulated 
power companies 
13.5 32.8 0.1 1.8 0.3 - 48.5 
Power generation 131.4 219.4 1.7 5.3 5.1 0.1 363.0 
Oil and gas: refining and marketing 142.9 278.2 - 13.0 4.4 0.1 438.6 
Building materials 23.2 26.1 0.0 1.9 0.6 0.0 52.0 
Chemicals-commodity 54.1 70.4 - 8.9 0.5 0.1 134.1 
Steel 21.3 27.0 - 1.3 1.5 0.0 51.1 
Mining-metals and other materials 
excluding coal 
17.3 38.7 - 0.5 0.8 0.0 57.3 
Automobile manufacturers 59.8 106.9 - 9.5 1.5 0.1 177.8 
Total 476.7 808.1 1.9 42.5 16.0 0.5 1345.7 
Note: Other loans not included in the table are construction financing, Islamic financing and construction loans (€3.3bn) mostly to the chemical, 
building material and oil and gas sectors.  
Source: Thomson ONE Banker. 
3. Some potential policy measures 
The potential risks that climate change could pose to financial stability ask for a systemic 
approach to identify, assess and manage the risks.10  
The Financial Stability Board (FSB) led Enhanced Disclosure Task Force (EDTF) already delivered 
recommendations to the G20 on climate-related financial disclosures adoptable by both 
financial as well as non-financial organisations in December 2016 (TCFD, 2016). The EDTF 
recommends that full financial disclosure should be provided in corporations’ mainstream or 
public financial filings with a strong focus on risks and opportunities related to the transition to 
a lower-carbon economy and that financial disclosure should be designed to solicit useful 
forward-looking information on financial impacts. In the particular case of banks, this paper 
                                                     
9 Acknowledging that project finance may involve large risks for the environment, the Equator Principles were 
established in 2003 to provide banks with voluntary guidance for incorporating environmental and social risks into 
their assessment of credit and operational risks in large infrastructure investment projects. As a result, many large 
global banking institutions have mainstreamed environmental governance principles into project finance (see 
http://www.equator-principles.com/resources/equator_principles_III.pdf). 
10 Regulators have put particular focus on ensuring that connected institutions are sound, adequately capitalised 
and supervised with effective risk management and disclosure systems incorporating climate risks. Some countries 
are moving in this direction. It is becoming more common for insurers to conduct regular stress testing and 
supervisors to specify scenarios including natural disasters. Some countries require additional reserves against 
possible catastrophe events. Solvency requirements may have capital requirements corresponding to catastrophe 
risk. Some insurers adjust premiums periodically based on loss experience. 
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argues that the EDTF recommendations could be articulated via i) improvements in the 
supervisory reporting with a focus on high environmental risk sectors in the short term and ii) 
the performance of a ‘carbon stress test’ as a forward-looking exercise to assess the 
environmental risks and impact on the transition to a low-carbon economy in the medium term.  
Additionally, this paper argues that the modification of other existing international frameworks, 
such as the guidelines for assessors of the Basel Core Principles for Effective Bank Supervision, 
should be considered in the medium term 
3.1 Short-term policy responses 
The short-term policy response heavily relies on better understanding of banks’ and other 
connected financial firms’ direct exposures to non-financial firms with immediate and emerging 
elevated environmental risks and the consequences of a disorderly transition to a low-carbon 
economy. Better disclosure of bank exposures would facilitate a timely assessment of potential 
risks to financial stability and promote a “smooth rather than an abrupt transition towards a 
lower-carbon economy.”11 
A reliable and fully harmonised statistical framework and effective disclosure 
Such a statistical framework would allow business, financial institutions, governments and 
rating agencies to have access to reliable and comparable statistical data. To that end, it is vital 
that the various categories for classifying economic activities are interpreted uniformly. The 
NACE Rev 2 and the International Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) frameworks allow for 
a relatively precise identification of economic activities exposed to risk in the transition to a 
low-carbon economy.12  
However, a good statistical classification method is not enough. Effective disclosure 
requirements are being set up for banks and other financial intermediaries playing a key role in 
improving governance by improving transparency for investors regarding their involvement in 
unsustainable economic activity. Institutional investors often question banks´ efforts to 
mainstream sustainability challenges into their business models as well as into their 
strategies.13 
                                                     
11 See FSB, “Developing Climate-related Financial Disclosures” (http://www.fsb.org/what-we-do/policy-
development/additional-policy-areas/developing-climate-related-financial-disclosures/). 
12 Regulation (EC) No 1893/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 December 2006 establishing 
the statistical classification of economic activities NACE Revision 2 and amending Council Regulation (EEC) No 
3037/90 as well as certain EC Regulations on specific statistical domains (OJ L 393, 30.12.2006, p. 1).  
13 Transparency is just one dimension of banks´ good corporate governance. The Basel Committee’s Corporate 
Governance Guidelines for Banks adopted in 2015 include a number of key concepts that are directly aligned with 
the consideration and management of environmental and social issues, namely: i) a recognition of the impact of 
banks on the broader setting in which they operate, ii) a recognition of banks’ accountability to a broad array of 
stakeholders, iii) an emphasis on the need for an enhanced risk culture and iv) the call for ethical and responsible 
behaviour (see https://www.bis.org/bcbs/publ/d328.pdf).  
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Supervisory reporting and other prudential tools to account for environmental risks  
Successful prudential reporting rests on three pillars: i) regular call reports with granular 
information on economic activities exposed to elevated environmental risks including 
concentration risks; ii) banks’ assessment of their Internal Capital Adequacy Assessment 
Process (ICAAP) and iii) credit registers regularly requesting granular credit risk data. This 
section focuses particularly on the experience of the EU and more specifically on the recent 
set-up put in place in the euro area: 
i) Call reports 
Call reports to assess the financial condition of banks as well as the sufficiency of their own 
funds that allow an accurate assessment of environmental risks require information of credit 
exposure to sectors with immediate and emerging elevated risks associated with the transition 
to a low carbon economy. Similarly, the reporting of large exposures to individual creditors 
requires reporting only by sector, which is insufficient to identify large exposures to economic 
activities at elevated risk in the transition to a green economy.14 It would require granular 
information at the level of at least 2 digits in the NACE Rev 2 classification and 4 digits in the 
SIC Classification, which is in line with what banks generally use internally. For example, in the 
EU common rule book for the regulatory requirements on own funds,15individual banking 
groups are required to submit harmonised, consolidated and IFRS-consistent quarterly financial 
statements: FINREP (balance sheet and income statements including the breakdown of loan 
advances to non-financial firms) and COREP (own funds) do not require detailed information of 
credit exposure to assess the immediate and emerging elevated risks associated with the 
transition to a low-carbon economy. Classification by only the 18 sectors is too broad.16 In 
COREP, the reporting of large exposures to individual creditors requires reporting also by 
sector, which, as explained above, is insufficient to identify large exposures to economic 
activities at risk in the transition to a green economy. The call reports of EU banks would require 
revision along the lines described above if prudential regulators want to give consideration to 
environmental risks.  
ii) Internal capital adequacy assessment 
Banks’ assessment of their internal capital adequacy, which is later assessed by their prudential 
supervisors, allows them to identify material risks and describe their management control. This 
would include environmental risks. Banks assess their regulatory capital requirements in the 
                                                     
14 Only exposures to individual creditors and not to groups of related companies.  
15 Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) Nº 680/2014 of 16 April 2014, laying down implementing technical 
standards with regard to supervisory reporting of institutions according to Regulation (EU) Nº 575/2013 of the EU 
Parliament and of the Council (L191, OJ 28-6-2014) (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32014R0680&from=EN), keeping the option for supervisors to ask for a less 
frequent reporting 
16 Agriculture, forestry and fishing, Mining and quarrying, Manufacturing, Electricity, gas, steam and air 
conditioning supply, Water supply, Construction, Wholesale and retail trade, Transport and storage, 
Accommodation and food service activities, Information and communication, Real estate activities, Real estate 
activities, Administrative and support service activities, Administrative and support service activities, Education, 
Human health services and social work activities, Arts, entertainment and recreation and Other services. 
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context of a stress test exercise under two plausible scenarios (baseline and stress). This 
exercise encompasses business risks associated with the transition to a low-carbon economy 
under various hypotheses of what impact such a transition could have on GDP growth. For 
example, at present, in the EU, banks generally do not assess the impact of risks involved in the 
transition to a low-carbon economy on their loan or bond portfolios. These portfolios are not 
regularly subject to shock simulations such as a sudden economic obsolescence of capital 
stocks or revaluation of fossil-fuel reserves, which would help assess the impact of the credit 
risk on the stressed portfolio in banks’ profits and solvency. 
iii) Granular credit-risk data 
Credit registers regularly collect granular credit-risk data from banks and other credit 
institutions. These databases are composed of detailed and individual pieces of information 
about instruments giving rise to credit risk, including classification of counterparties according 
to their economic activities and subsectors of the economy exposed to elevated environmental 
risks. Credit registers can also provide important breakdowns and details, such as information 
on the structure (e.g. project finance) and risk patterns of credit granted by the financial sector 
(e.g. probabilities of default, impairments, maturity, currency, interest rates). For example, in 
the euro area, the ECB has launched a credit register called Anacredit, which fulfils these 
requirements to assess the risks associated with the transition to a low-carbon economy. 17  
3.2 Medium-term policy response 
The medium-term policy response relies heavily not only on better governance of banks and 
other financial institutions but also on an effective prudential regulatory framework, which 
would take into consideration the importance of the environmental risks. 
A) Bank supervisors to consider transition risks 
The Basel Core Principles (BCPs) are used as a benchmark for assessing the quality of 
supervisory systems by the IMF and World Bank and providing a common ground of sound 
supervisory practices.18  
A comprehensive approach to an orderly transition to a low-carbon economy would require 
prudential supervisors of banks to internalise environmental risks in their governance systems 
and procedures as well as in the banking regulatory framework. Hence, environmental aspects 
should be included in frameworks for the: governance of bank supervision,19 definition of 
                                                     
17 The ECB has the power to impose sanctions on reporting agents that fail to comply with statistical reporting 
requirements defined or imposed in ECB regulations or decisions. Regulation (EU) 2016/867 of the European 
Central Bank of 18 May, 2016 on the collection of granular credit and credit risk data (ECB/2016/13) (L144 OJ 
1.6.2016) (see http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32016R0867&from=ES). 
18 See http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs230.pdf. The BCPs were complemented a few years later by similar codes for 
the supervision of securities operations (IOSCO) and insurance supervision (IAIS). 
19 For example, licensing criteria, supervisory techniques and tools internal control and audits. 
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capital adequacy,20 risk assessment process of banks,2122 disclosure and transparency 
requirements23 and international coordination among prudential supervisors.24  
Along these lines, it could be argued that the guidelines for assessors of the BCPs should be 
further revised to require bank supervisors to consider the risk associated with the transition 
to a low-carbon economy in their supervisory practices, such as stress tests, as well as in the 
banking regulatory framework.25  
B) “Carbon stress test” for banks  
ESRB (2016) and Schoenmaker & Van Tilburg (2016) argue that prudential regulators could run 
“carbon stress tests” to assess the impact on banks’ capital and profitability of an adverse 
scenario consisting of a disorderly transition to a low-carbon economy that could affect 
systemic risk. Large plausible environmental shocks could affect systemic risk via two channels 
(see also Figure 1): 
(i) The impact on GDP as a result of supply and/or demand disruptions caused by the adverse 
effects of direct environmental hazards (e.g. drought) or severe natural or man-made 
disasters (e.g. deforestation); regulatory and other policy initiatives that seek to mitigate or 
prevent said environmental hazards (e.g. carbon taxes) and disruptive technological shocks 
related to the management of environmental risks (e.g. improvements in technology of 
solar panels) and 
(ii) Banks’ direct exposure to sectors with immediate or emerging elevated environmental risks 
(e.g. mining and coal, unregulated utilities and power companies).  
                                                     
20 For example, Pillar 2 stress testing and Pillar 3 disclosures. 
21 For example, a risk management process that takes into account loan exposures to sectors with immediate or 
emerging elevated environmental risks and identifies, measures, evaluates, monitors, reports and controls or 
mitigates concentrations of risk, including those related to the transition to a low-carbon economy on a timely 
basis. 
22 For example, in the US, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) has issued guidelines for supervisors 
in connection with the supervision of banks’ “Oil and Gas Exploration and Production Lending”. These are 
guidelines on prudent credit, interest rate, liquidity, operational and reputational risks management. See 
https://occ.gov/publications/publications-by-type/comptrollers-handbook/pub-ch-og.pdf. 
23 For example, bank disclosures that reveal inter alia the processes, including environmental risk assessments and 
business strategies to incorporate the adjustment costs to the transition to a low-carbon economy. 
24 For example, cooperation also encompasses home and host supervisors’ assessment of banks’ risks exposure to 
environmental risks as well as systemic risks related to the disorderly transition to a low-carbon economy. 
25 See www.bis.org/publ/bcbs130.pdf . The Core Principles Methodology (2006) is used for assessments of 
compliance with the BCPs. 
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Figure 1. Stylised representation of the carbon stress test 
 
Note: The figure presents a view of the way in which a shock might impact banks’ capital adequacy ratio (CAR) and profit and 
loss (P&L). 
Source: Author’s analysis. 
As is the case with typical bank stress testing, in the “carbon stress tests” for each bank and 
category of credit risk exposure to environmental risk the losses can be computed by combining 
the stressed probability of defaults (PDs) with the stressed loss giving defaults (LGDs) once the 
timeframe has been defined (generally one to three years) and the shock has been calibrated. 
Shocks should also take account of path dependencies (e.g. empirics show that a downgrade is 
more likely after a previous downgrade). The losses can be measured on an incremental basis 
(in percentage points) against the losses obtained for the projected baseline scenario and/or 
against losses obtained from PDs and LGDs observed in a reference year. The presentation of 
outcomes of the “carbon stress tests” exercises is based on the impact on regulatory capital 
requirements and the impact on after-tax profits over the defined time frame (provisioning, 
write-offs and income arrears). 
Moody’s (2015) highlights three primary credit effects from carbon-reduction policies for non-
financial corporates: Regulatory risks; disruptive technology shocks that would have a negative 
impact on incumbents with limited capability to adapt their business models and direct costs 
such as the imposition of carbon taxes or purchase of carbon permits.26 27 
                                                     
26 (i) Regulatory risks (e.g. like the planned closure of all German nuclear generating stations in 2022 or the goal 
to achieve a certain percentage of power from renewable sources or percentage reduction in emissions); (ii) 
disruptive technology shocks that would have a negative impact on incumbents with limited capability to adapt 
their business models (e.g. coal producers face long-term demand for carbon-intensive energy but also suffer from 
other more immediate factors, such as the impact of the US shale gas boom); and (iii) direct costs such as the 
imposition of carbon taxes or purchase of carbon permits (e.g. carbon-emitting plants that incur carbon taxes, 
plants that must buy emissions credits to operate and plants that must install environmental equipment to 
continue to operate).  
27 Moody´s (2015) defends the co-existence of environmental risks with other drivers of credit risk. Environmental 
risks are one of the drivers of credit risks. It considers environmental risks vis-à-vis other issuer or sector 
characteristics that may mitigate or exacerbate their impact. For example, for an industry that contends with 
environmental risks as well as other risks and future liabilities (e.g. pensions), their significance to ratings does not 
lie in analysing exactly how much pressure environmental risks represent, but rather in assessing in aggregate how 
the totality of risks will affect an issuer’s default and recovery. At present, direct climate change hazards are, in 
general, not a material driver for credit ratings. 
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The sensitivity of loan quality can be assessed for each loan across all loans in the portfolio 
using special models (see Annex 1 for an example).  
From the viewpoint of the transition to a low-carbon economy, longer timeframes give 
borrowers more time to adapt and increase the likelihood that technology will change or that 
lower cost solutions can be implemented. It also gives a borrower the opportunity to change 
its business model or its balance sheet in order to adapt to long-term environmental risks. 
However, this rationale does not apply in the case of credit event risks with low probability and 
high severity, which can take place in the transition to a low-carbon economy (e.g. sudden 
regulatory changes, liabilities from environmental disasters).  
Indeed, further analysis is needed to define climate change risks and understand transmission. 
Credit risks related to the transition to a low-carbon economy merit continued attention as 
additional information becomes available to inform credit risk assessments. Against this 
background, the design of consistent and comparable environmental risk exposure data across 
countries as well as reliable and efficient climate-related financial disclosure rules are 
paramount. At present, although most G20 jurisdictions have some type of rule or regulatory 
guidance that requires climate-related disclosure for at least some corporations, a limited 
number pertain directly to climate-related financial risks. This can be explained partly by the 
lack of a generally agreed-upon definition of “material” climate risk that triggers disclosure 
requirements (TCFD, 2016, p. 15) comparable to the Moody’s (2015) definition of sectors 
exposed to elevated environmental risk. 
C) Conceptual framework for (new) prudential regulatory requirements: Environmental aspects 
If the impact of environmental risks results in credit losses of certain bank exposures (e.g. due 
to the negative impact on the borrower’s credit standing as a result of the obsolescence of the 
technology used for the production of solar panels), such losses would be covered with loan 
loss provisions, which would have a negative impact on banks’ after-tax profits.  
If environmental risks have a permanent impact through the economic business cycle and 
permanently increase the long-term PD of exposures to elevated environmental risk sectors or 
sovereigns, prudential regulators should consider a revision of the minimum capital 
requirements. They should base their revision on the carbon intensity of individual exposures 
via the increase of the asset risk weights in order to curb banks’ incentives to accumulate 
exposures subject to elevated environmental risks, hence, a penalisation prudential 
regulation.28 This subsequent increase of the minimum capital requirement associated with 
that asset class (including off-balance sheet exposures) should cover any unexpected losses. 
Another measure that regulators may consider to discourage environmental risks relates to the 
potential revisions to banks’ large exposures framework. The goal of these measures is to place 
a quantity-based limit on exposures relative to a bank’s Tier 1 capital and/or price-based 
                                                     
28 Indeed, it could be argued that large uncertainty exists about the particular quantification of the impact of the 
environmental risks, which makes it difficult to calibrate risk weights. 
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constraints (or a combination of both) on the amount of exposures to sectors/sovereigns with 
elevated environmental risk – i.e. risk-weight add-ons. Disincentives could also be based on 
risk-weight add-ons in incremental steps as large exposures increase as a percentage of Tier 1 
capital instead of a flat risk-weight add-on. However, in addition to the difficulties of calibrating 
the risk weights, the downside of price-based constraints is that they may not be sufficient to 
promote change in bank behaviour. Furthermore, risk-weight add-ons based on the amount of 
a bank’s exposure may not be sufficient in case of severe shocks due to a disorderly transition 
to a low-carbon economy. 
Last but not least, prudential supervisors could consider transparency requirements via 
enhancements to the Pillar 3 disclosure requirements in the context of the Basel III framework, 
which could include semi-annual disclosure requirements related to environmental risk 
exposures to corporate and sovereigns as well as their risk weights. Enhancements could 
include a breakdown by accounting classification as well as a breakdown by portfolio duration.  
At present, most supervisory agencies in the G20 countries do not believe that minimum capital 
requirements (or prudential regulatory requirements in general) should be used to limit 
environmental risks (Alexander, 2014). 
4. Conclusions and some policy reflections 
The banking sector is most immediately affected by the financial risks associated with the 
disorderly transition to a low-carbon economy, which could affect banks’ exposure to systemic 
risk both via impaired GDP growth and banks’ exposure to elevated environmental risk assets. 
Banks are slowly growing aware of these considerations.29 
As of December 2014, the (syndicated) loan exposure to elevated environmental risk sectors in 
the five main banking sectors was estimated to amount to approximately €1.35 trillion, mostly 
to companies involved in the exploitation of oil and gas and power generation. Moreover, these 
sectors show high leverage ratios, a fact that aggravates potential systemically important 
second-round effects. Those exposures account for a non-negligible percentage of total assets 
of the banking systems in the respective countries, although comparisons are limited by the 
differences in the accounting frameworks. In addition, banks are exposed to environmental 
risks in their equity and bond (corporates and sovereigns particularly LIDCs) portfolios.  
Against this background, the objective of prudential policies should be to internalise the 
potential negative externalities associated with climate change by both banks and their 
prudential supervisors. Short-term policy action should aim at obtaining a better understanding 
of the direct exposures to high environmental risk sectors, which demands a reliable and fully 
                                                     
29 For example, in November 2016, France’s Société Generale announced that it will stop financing coal-powered 
electricity plants starting from January 2017, and increase its support for renewable energy projects and scale 
back outstanding loans to the coal industry “with a goal of reducing the proportion of coal-fuelled share in power 
production financed by the bank to 19 percent by 2020” (see 
http://af.reuters.com/article/commoditiesNews/idAFL8N1CX4K5).. 
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harmonised statistical framework that allows both banks and their supervisors to make a 
detailed identification of sectors exposed to high environmental risks along the SIC (and NACE 
in the EEA) classification frameworks. 
Among the supervisory tools, this paper highlights the importance of credit registers as a tool 
that facilitates the assessment of environmental risk drivers in “carbon stress tests” formulated 
to assess the sensitivity of loan quality to changes in climate risk factors such as regulatory risks, 
disruptive technology shocks and/or direct costs such as the imposition of carbon 
taxes/purchase of carbon permits. To the extent that environmental risks could permanently 
increase the long-term probabilities of default of homogeneous loan portfolios through the 
business cycle, prudential regulators should consider a revision of banks’ minimum capital 
requirements. 
Last but not least, a comprehensive approach to an orderly transition to a low-carbon economy 
would require prudential supervisors and banks to internalise environmental risks in their 
governance systems. Revisions of the assessment methodology of the Basel Core Principles for 
Effective Bank Supervision should be considered to take environmental aspects into 
consideration.  
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Annex 1. Models for climate change factors 
Models can be formulated to assess the sensitivity of loan quality, for each loan across loan 
portfolio categories, to changes in macroeconomic conditions as well as climate factors.  
 
NPLi,t = 𝛼0  + 𝛽(𝐶𝑙𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟)𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼1 NPLi,t-1 +∑ βF, t − s 
𝐾
𝑠=0  MACRO F,t-s + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
  
Where NPLi,t stands for the logit transformation of non-performing loans (NPLs) as a ratio over 
total loans of credit institution i in year t, α0  stands for the fixed-effect for credit institution i, 
β gauges the specific climate factor i in year t and MACROF, t-s stands for macroeconomic 
factor F, in period t-s (s is the time lag).  
The typical macroeconomic specifications include GDP growth and long-term interest rates but 
could also include sectoral economic variables. An example of climate factors for a particular 
sector is the value of stranded assets due to new disruptive technologies over profits before 
taxes of that particular sector. The regression analysis would show the statistical significance of 
this environmental factor. 
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